Tsur Shezaf

Yemen is a Tribal State, Even when there was an ostensibly central government in Sana’a, people outside the cities were always armed. No man would go without a Janbiya—a curved dagger—or a Kalashnikov, and even young boys carried weapons.

The tribal division is significant. What unites the tribes is religion, not governance. Within this union, there are Sunni and Shiite tribes.

The Houthis are part of Yemen’s Shiite minority (approximately 30%), which consists of two main groups: the Zaydis and the Ismailis. The Zaydis are the more aggressive group, while the Ismailis, despite a history of significant violence, are less militant and form the majority of the Shiite population. The Houthis’ stronghold is in Sa’ada, in the mountains of northern Yemen. Sana’a, Yemen’s traditional capital, lies within Yemen’s Shiite region.

The conflict between the Houthis and Yemen’s central government has a history of approximately 30 years. In 2008, the central government in Sana’a evacuated the Jews from Sa’ada after the Houthis threatened them—not so much because of their Judaism, but because the Yemeni government had ties with the United States.

The Iranians identified the potential of the Houthis and, being of the same Shiite faith, nurtured and trained them. To counter the Houthis, it would suffice to create a Sunni—or even Shiite—tribal alliance to rival them and push them back to their territory. This represents the long-term dynamics of Yemen and its tribes.

The War with the Houthis

In 2015, the Houthis seized control of Sana’a. Following the outbreak of war in Gaza and later in Lebanon, the Houthis decided to target Red Sea shipping routes, aiming to harm Israel economically, and if possible, physically as well.

The war in the Red Sea did not begin in October 2023; it has been ongoing for 13 years but largely kept under the radar. According to the intelligence agency Stratfor, Israel has maintained a naval and air base in the Dahlak Archipelago—an island group opposite Massawa, Eritrea’s main coastal city and port.

According to these sources, Israel also operates radar stations on Mount Amba Sawra, which rises 3,000 meters above sea level.

Foreign publications claim that Israel and Eritrea maintain close ties. Israel has trained and supplied arms to a regime considered one of the darkest dictatorships in Africa and the world. The construction of Israel’s border fence with Egypt from 2010 to 2013 was part of an agreement between Israel and Isaias Afwerki, the Eritrean dictator. This move aimed more to prevent Eritreans from fleeing the impoverished nation than to protect Israel from refugees.

In exchange for building the fence, Israel gained access to the port and airport in the Dahlak Archipelago, facilities originally constructed by the Soviets during the Cold War, when Ethiopia, then ruling Eritrea, was an ally of the USSR. The strategic location of the Dahlak Archipelago—just 150 kilometers from Al Hudaydah, the main port serving the Houthis—makes it an ideal launching point for operations in northern Yemen.

Reports also suggest that the Israeli navy operates various vessels in the area, and the arrival of new landing craft has increased its capacity to deploy and supply forces along the Red Sea coast and possibly in the Persian Gulf.

Some speculate that Israel’s alleged proposal to recognize Somaliland, located south of Eritrea, may indicate an existing Israeli presence there. However, this does not necessarily confirm Israel’s intentions, nor would it be prudent for Israel to land forces in Yemen. A more effective approach would be to close airports and airspace, disable ports, and prevent the shipment of ballistic missiles from Iran.

Drones of various types pose less of a threat.

The best strategy remains “boots on the ground”—guiding and supplying local tribal forces to fight the Houthis and push them northward to their strongholds near the Saudi border. Cutting off their military and civilian supply lines while fomenting internal unrest is key.

Yemen’s long coastline provides a good opportunity for ambushing shipping routes. The high ground of Sana’a makes it an excellent location for radar and warning stations. These factors have already manifested in attacks deep into Saudi Arabia, targeting oil fields and disrupting international waterways. While these are relatively easy targets, they have already sustained damage.

Since 2015, the Houthis have funded their activities through the sale of oil, gas, coffee, and qat, supplying both local and international buyers. These exports will likely cease in the near future, as the destruction of port docks has prevented the supply of ballistic missiles and other armaments.

Israel neither can nor should occupy or invade Yemen. Reports in the Israeli press suggest that the IDF is considering a naval blockade of Yemen, the only viable option for Israel. Merchant ships and tankers are already unable to reach the fuel terminal at Al Hudaydah or the ports north of it.

Smuggling Routes and Future Prospects

What remains are the age-old methods of smuggling across the relatively narrow and turbulent Red Sea, dotted with numerous islands that provide cover for smugglers. Arms dealers will be eager to supply weapons to the Houthis, but their primary financial pipelines have been severed, leaving only Iranian support.

If the Israeli Navy has a reason to increase its patrols and use drones to track ships and fast boats, it is to halt arms smuggling.

The Houthis are more of a nuisance than a significant threat. After a year of harassment, their main accomplishment has not been harming Israel or its citizens but disrupting Egypt and shipping companies unable to navigate through the Suez Canal and forced to detour around Africa.

Grandiose statements from Israeli journalists and politicians about striking Tehran are somewhat exaggerated. While Iran supplies weapons and shares religious affiliation with the Houthis, it is doubtful they directly control them. The goal of all naval forces operating in the Red Sea and beyond the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is to choke off Houthi support.

Simultaneously, southern Yemen’s Sunni faction, centered in Aden, includes several armed groups opposed to the Houthis. Yemen has always been a tribal land, even under Ottoman rule, where the empire primarily relied on shifting alliances with the tribes.

In tribal areas, success depends on identifying the largest, most aggressive tribe with leadership potential and nurturing it to counter opposing groups. This may already be happening, as many tribes likely await the Houthis’ weakening to step in as the “boots on the ground” that Israel and other forces in the Red Sea hope will push the Houthis back to the Sa’ada mountains, returning them to their original size and influence.